The English term “chance” is the closest translation for Aristotle’s term αὐτόματον in Greek. Aristotle’s broad concept of αὐτόματον includes τύχη, luck or fortune, applicable to human actions, and αὐτόματον, chance, applicable to natural spontaneity. ¹ “Chance” in English contains the meaning of (1) the possibility of something happening, (2) the occurrence and development of events in the absence of any obvious design or cause, and (3) accidental. ² “Chance” in English shares with Aristotle’s term αὐτόματον a sense of absence of design or cause and a sense of being accidental. However, Aristotle’s term αὐτόματον contains a stronger sense of coincidence with another event than “chance” does in English. In addition, Aristotle’s term αὐτόματον contains a stronger sense of rarity and unusualness which the English term “chance” lacks. The difference in meaning between αὐτόματον and “chance” and the problem of capturing the meaning of a term in another language may be illustrated by attempting to translate both terms into Chinese. To translate Aristotelian αὐτόματον into Chinese, either 碰巧 (pengqiao) or 巧合 (qiaohe), both meaning “by coincidence,” would be a better translation than 机会 (jihui), meaning opportunity, or 可能性 (kenengxing), meaning possibility, the two closest terms in Chinese for “chance” in English. The terms 碰巧 (pengqiao) and 巧合 (qiaohe), meaning “by coincidence,” do not contain a strong sense of rarity and unusualness as does the Aristotelian αὐτόματον; a different Chinese term 偶 然 (ouran), meaning “occasional,” is needed to express a sense of rarity. The linguistic differences between Greek and English being such that the English term “chance” and the Aristotelian αὐτόματον are clearly not identical. Specifically, although both terms express a sense of being accidental, Aristotelian αὐτόματον has a more pronounced sense of coincidence and unusualness and the English term “chance” has a more pronounced sense of possibility.

The Aristotelian chance discussed here corresponds to Aristotelian αὐτόματον which carries a more pronounced sense of coincidence and unusualness and a lesser sense of possibility than the term “chance” as we know it. Understanding Aristotelian chance is important to understanding Aristotle’s other concepts such as his teleology and his doctrine of four causes. Aristotle’s main discussion of chance appears in Physics II, iv-vi. His first definition of chance is as follows:

Now things of this sort [i.e. events which for the sake of something], whenever they come to be incidentally, we say are from luck. (For just as in the case of being also, there is being per se and being incidentally, so it is possible for something to be a cause.) … As has been said, therefore, whenever this comes to be [i.e. when something comes to be incidentally] among the things which came to be for the sake of something, then it is said [to be] from chance or from luck (196b23-31)

Besides a first condition that a chance event has to “come to be incidentally,” a second condition is that a chance event is for the sake of something. ^{3  4} However, it is not clear and there is no general agreement on what the “something” is in “for the sake of something.” This essay attempts to explore this particular question.